A zero sum differential game in a Hilbert space  by Ghosh, Mrinal K. et al.
J. Math. Anal. Appl. 283 (2003) 167–179
www.elsevier.com/locate/jmaa
A zero sum differential game in a Hilbert space ✩
Mrinal K. Ghosh,∗ A.K. Nandakumaran, and
K.S. Mallikarjuna Rao 1
Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560 012, India
Received 19 October 2001
Submitted by William F. Ames
Abstract
We study a zero sum differential game of fixed duration in a separable Hilbert space. We prove
a minimax principle and establish the equivalence between the dynamic programming principle and
the existence of a saddle point equilibrium. We also prove sufficient conditions for optimality.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study a zero sum differential game of fixed duration involving con-
trolled semilinear evolution equations in a separable Hilbert space. The theory of zero sum
differential games in Euclidean space was initiated by Isaacs [7]. He extended the notion
of value, optimal strategies, saddle point equilibrium, etc. from static games to a dynamic
situation. Using some formal arguments, he showed that the value function is a solution of
certain nonlinear partial differential equation, now known as Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs (HJI
for short) equation. Under the assumption that the HJI equation has a smooth solution and
certain other assumptions, he proved the existence of optimal strategies and saddle point
equilibrium. But the existence of a smooth solution of HJI equation is more of an exception
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approaches to differential games were carried out. Notable contributions were made by
Fleming, Friedman, Roxin, Varaiya, Lin, Elliott, Kalton, Krasovski, Subbotin, Berkovitz,
and others; see Chapter 4 in [1] and references therein. Evans and Souganidis [4] followed
Elliott–Kalton approach to differential games and showed that the upper and lower val-
ues of the game were viscosity solutions to HJI equations. Many results along these lines
have been carried out by many authors; see [1] and references therein. Kocan et al. [8]
have studied zero sum differential games in infinite dimensional spaces and have charac-
terized the upper and lower values in the sense of Elliott–Kalton as viscosity solution of
HJI equation in infinite dimensions. Though Elliott–Kalton approach to differential games
is indeed a very powerful one, certain important concepts like saddle point equilibrium,
minimax principle, etc. are not well suited in this framework. In this paper, we follow the
original formulation of differential games by Isaacs. We study the differential game in the
framework of (open loop) relaxed strategies. In this setup, we first establish a minimax
principle to characterize a saddle point equilibrium. Then we establish the equivalence be-
tween the dynamic programming principle (DPP for short) and the existence of a saddle
point equilibrium via the theory of viscosity solutions introduced in [3]. Finally we estab-
lish a connection between the minimax principle and DPP via sub and super-differentials
of value function and then prove sufficient conditions for optimality. We now describe the
problem.
Let Ui , i = 1,2, be compact metric spaces and let Mi be the space of probability
measures on Ui . Let H be a real and separable Hilbert space and let T be the duration
of the game. Let A be a possibly unbounded linear operator generating a semigroup of
contractions S(t), 0 t  T . Note that there exist constants M,ω > 0 such that∥∥S(t)∥∥Meωt
for all t  0. Let
b¯ : [0, T ] ×H ×U1 ×U2 →H.
We make the following assumption on b¯.
(A1) b¯ is continuous and there exists C1 > 0 such that∥∥b¯(t, x, u1, u2)− b¯(s, y,u1, u2)∥∥ C1(|t − s| + ‖x − y‖),
∀ui ∈ Ui, t, s ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈H.
Define
b : [0, T ] ×H ×M1 ×M2 →H
by
b(t, x,µ1,µ2)=
∫
U1
∫
U2
b¯(t, x, u1, u2)µ2(du2)µ1(du1).
For t ∈ [0, T ], a measurable function µ(·) : [t, T ]→Mi is called an open loop relaxed
strategy for player i , i = 1,2, at time t . Let At denote the set of all (open loop) relaxedi
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gies (µ1(·),µ2(·)) ∈At1 ×At2, then the state of the system evolves according to{
d
ds
X(s)+AX(s)= b(s,X(s),µ1(s),µ2(s)), s ∈ (t, T ],
X(t)= x. (1.1)
Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), there is a unique mild solution for (1.1) (see [9]).
Let
r¯ : [0, T ] ×H ×U1 ×U2 → R
be the running payoff function and let
g :H → R
be the terminal payoff function. We assume that
(A2) (i) The functions r¯ and g are continuous.
(ii) There are constants C2,C3 > 0 for all t, s ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈H, ui ∈ Ui satisfying∣∣r¯(t, x, u1, u2)− r¯(s, y,u1, u2)∣∣ C2(|t − s| + ‖x − y‖),∣∣g(x)− g(y)∣∣C3‖x − y‖.
Let
r : [0, T ] ×H ×M1 ×M2 → R
be defined by
r(t, x,µ1,µ2)=
∫
U1
∫
U2
r¯(t, x, u1, u2)µ2(du2)µ1(du1).
When the state of the system is at x at time t and players use (open loop) relaxed
strategies (µ1(·),µ2(·)) ∈At1 ×At2, then payoff to player 1 by player 2 is given by
R
(
t, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)=
T∫
t
r
(
s,X(s),µ1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds + g(X(T )),
where X(·) is the solution of (1.1). The upper and lower values V + and V− are defined as
follows:
V +(t, x)= inf
µ2(·)∈At2
sup
µ1(·)∈At1
R
(
t, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
, (1.2)
V −(t, x)= sup
µ1(·)∈At1
inf
µ2(·)∈At2
R
(
t, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
. (1.3)
A relaxed strategy µ∗1(·) ∈At1 is said to be optimal for player 1 at (t, x) if
R
(
t, x,µ∗1(·),µ2(·)
)
 V+(t, x)
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player 2 at (t, x) if
R
(
t, x,µ1(·),µ∗2(·)
)
 V−(t, x)
for any µ1(·) ∈ At1. Thus a pair of optimal relaxed strategies constitutes a saddle point
equilibrium. The game is said to have value in relaxed strategies if V +(t, x)= V−(t, x) :=
V (t, x). In such a case, V is referred to as the value function of the game.
We endow Ati with the L1-weak-topology. Using Banach–Alaoglu theorem, we can
verify that Ati is a compact metric space; see [11] for more details. Under this topol-
ogy, (A1) and (A2) imply that R(t, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)) is continuous in µ1(·) for fixed t , x ,
and µ2(·). Similarly it is continuous in µ2(·) for fixed t , x , and µ1(·). Thus ‘inf’ and ‘sup’
in (1.2) and (1.3) may be replaced by ‘min’ and ‘max,’ respectively.
We use the following notation in the sequel: H ∗ denotes the dual of H , A∗ denotes the
adjoint of a linear operator A on H , 〈· , ·〉H and 〈· , ·〉H ∗ stands for the inner products in H
and H ∗, respectively, whereas 〈· , ·〉H,H ∗ stands for the duality pairing.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we establish a minimax
principle to characterize a saddle point equilibrium. In Section 3, we establish the equiv-
alence between DPP and saddle point equilibrium. We also prove the existence of saddle
point equilibrium in a specific case. Finally we establish the connection between minimax
principle and DPP. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Minimax principle
In this section, we derive a minimax principle. We make the following assumption:
(A3) For (t, u1, u2) ∈ [0, T ] ×U1 ×U2, b¯(t, · , u1, u2), r¯(t, · , u1, u2), g¯ are continuously
Fréchet differentiable.
Let the Hamiltonian
G : [0, T ] ×H ×H ∗ ×M1 ×M2 → R
be defined by
G(t, x,p,µ1,µ2)=
〈
b(t, x,µ1,µ2),p
〉
H,H ∗ + r(t, x,µ1,µ2). (2.1)
Let (µ∗1(·),µ∗2(·)) be a pair of optimal relaxed strategies and let X∗(·) be the correspond-
ing state process with X∗(0)= x . Consider p(t) = U∗(T , t)gx(X∗(T )), where U is the
solution operator of{
∂U(s,t)
∂s
+AU(s, t)= bx(s,X∗(s),µ∗1(s),µ∗2(s))U(s, t),
U(t, t)= I. (2.2)
We now prove the following minimax principle.
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min
µ2∈M2
max
µ1∈M1
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ1,µ2
)= max
µ1∈M1
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ1,µ∗2(t)
)
= max
µ1∈M1
min
µ2∈M2
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ1,µ2
)= min
µ2∈M2
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ∗1(t),µ2
)
.
(2.3)
Proof. We prove the theorem for the case r ≡ 0. The general case can be done in a stan-
dard manner by augmenting an extra space variable under our assumptions (see [2]). Now
onwards, we assume r ≡ 0.
Fix µ1 ∈M1 and let I be the set of all Lebesgue points of the function b(· ,X∗(·),µ1,
µ∗2(·))− b(· ,X∗(·),µ∗1(·),µ∗2(·)). Then I is of full measure. Fix t ∈ I . Let # > 0. Define
µ#1(s)=
{
µ∗1(s) if s /∈ [t − #, t],
µ1 if s ∈ [t − #, t].
Let X#(·) be the trajectory under the controls (µ#1(·),µ∗2(·)) with the initial condition
X#(0)= x . Let z(s)=U(s, t)(b(t,X∗(t),µ1,µ∗2(t))−b(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ∗2(t))), i.e., z(·)
is the unique mild solution of{
z˙(s)+Az(s)= bx(s,X∗(s),µ∗1(s),µ∗2(s))z(s), s  t,
z(t)= b(t,X∗(t),µ1,µ∗2(t))− b(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ∗2(t)).
We claim that (X#(s)−X∗(s))/# → z(s) as # ↓ 0 uniformly in [t, T ]. We now prove the
claim. Let s  t . Then
X#(s)−X∗(s)
=
s∫
0
S(s − τ )[b(τ,X#(τ ),µ#1(τ ),µ∗2(τ ))− b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ∗1(τ ),µ∗2(τ ))]dτ
=
s∫
t−#
S(s − τ )[b(τ,X#(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))− b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ∗1(τ ),µ∗2(τ ))]dτ
=
s∫
t−#
S(s − τ )[b(τ,X#(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))− b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))]dτ
+
s∫
t−#
S(s − τ )[b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))− b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ∗1(τ ),µ∗2(τ ))]dτ.
Now ∣∣∣∣∣X#(s)−X∗(s)
−
s∫
S(s − τ )[b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))− b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ∗1(τ ),µ∗2(τ ))]dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
t−#
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∣∣∣∣∣
s∫
t−#
S(s − τ )[b(τ,X#(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))− b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))]dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
 CMeωT
s∫
t−#
∣∣X#(τ)−X∗(τ )∣∣dτ
 CMeωT
s∫
t−#
∣∣∣∣∣X#(τ)−X∗(τ )
−
τ∫
t−#
S(τ − σ)[b(σ,X∗(σ ),µ1,µ∗2(σ ))− b(σ,X∗(σ ),µ∗1(σ ),µ∗2(σ ))]dσ
∣∣∣∣∣dτ
+CM2e2ωT
s∫
t−#
τ∫
t−#
∣∣b(σ,X∗(σ ),µ1,µ∗2(σ ))
− b(σ,X∗(σ ),µ∗1(σ ),µ∗2(σ ))∣∣dσ dτ.
Since t ∈ I ,
s∫
t−#
τ∫
t−#
∣∣b(σ,X∗(σ ),µ1,µ∗2(σ ))− b(σ,X∗(σ ),µ∗1(σ ),µ∗2(σ ))∣∣dσ dτ  o(#)
for all s ∈ [t − #, t]. Thus∣∣∣∣∣X#(s)−X∗(s)
−
s∫
t−#
S(s − τ )[b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ1,µ∗2(τ ))− b(τ,X∗(τ ),µ∗1(τ ),µ∗2(τ ))]dτ
∣∣∣∣∣ o(#).
Note that under assumptions (A1) and (A3), both X#(·) and X∗(·) are differentiable with
respect to the initial condition X#(t) = x , X∗(t) = x. Now divide the above expression
by # and let # ↓ 0. Then it follows that (X#(s)−X∗(s))/# → z(s) as # ↓ 0 uniformly in
[t, T ].
Since (µ∗1(·),µ∗2(·)) is a saddle point equilibrium, we have
1
#
[
g
(
X#(T )
)− g(X∗(T ))] 0. (2.4)
Using the claim, we now obtain〈
p, z(T )
〉
 0.
Thus 〈
p,U(T , t)b
(
t,X∗(t),µ1,µ∗2(t)
)− b(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ∗2(t))〉 0,
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p(t), b
(
t,X∗(t),µ1,µ∗2(t)
)− b(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ∗2(t))〉 0.
Thus for a.e. t ,
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ1,µ∗2(t)
)
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ∗1(t),µ∗2(t)
)
.
Note that here µ1 is arbitrary. Similarly we can show that for a.e. t and for all µ2,
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ∗1(t),µ2
)
G
(
t,X∗(t),p(t),µ∗1(t),µ∗2(t)
)
.
Using these two inequalities we obtain (2.3). ✷
3. Dynamic programming and saddle point equilibrium
In this section, we prove the equivalence between DPP and the existence of saddle point
equilibrium. We first state a lemma whose proof is omitted (see [2] for a proof of this result
in the case of control problem).
Lemma 3.1. Assume (A1) and (A2). Then the value functions V + and V− are continuous
and Lipschitz continuous in the space variable. Furthermore, if the operator A is analytic,
then they are jointly Lipschitz continuous.
We now prove the DPP under the assumption that a saddle point equilibrium exists.
Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1) and (A2) and that a saddle point equilibrium exists for (t, x).
Then for 0 t < t +∆< T ,
V +(t, x)= min
µ2(·)∈At2
max
µ1(·)∈At1
[ t+∆∫
t
r
(
s,X(s),µ1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds
+ V+(t +∆,X(t +∆))
]
, (3.1)
where X(·) is solution of (1.1) under (µ1(·),µ2(·)) with X(t)= x . Similarly,
V −(t, x)= max
µ1(·)∈At1
min
µ2(·)∈At2
[ t+∆∫
t
r
(
s,X(s),µ1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds
+ V−(t +∆,X(t +∆))
]
. (3.2)
Proof. Let (µ∗1(·),µ∗2(·)) ∈At1 ×At2 be a saddle point equilibrium for (t, x). Denote the
right-hand side of (3.1) by W(t, x). For any µ2(·) ∈At , we have2
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µ1(·)∈At1
[ t+∆∫
t
r
(
s,X(s),µ1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds + V +(t +∆,X(t +∆))
]
,
(3.3)
whereX(·) is the solution of (1.1) under (µ1(·),µ2(·)) with X(t)= x . Let (τ, x¯) ∈ [0, T ]×
H and µ¯2 ∈Aτ2 . Define V +µ¯2 by
V +µ¯2(τ, x¯)= maxµ1(·)∈Aτ1
[ T∫
τ
r
(
s, X¯(s),µ1(s), µ¯2(s)
)
ds + g(X¯(T ))
]
,
where X¯(·) is the solution of (1.1) under (µ1(·), µ¯2(·)) with X¯(τ ) = x¯. Now using DPP
for optimal control (see [10]), we have
V +µ¯2(τ, x¯)= maxµ1(·)∈Aτ1
[ τ+∆∫
τ
r
(
s, X¯(s),µ1(s), µ¯2(s)
)
ds + V +µ¯2
(
τ +∆,X¯(τ +∆))
]
(3.4)
for any τ < τ +∆< T . Also, we have
V +(τ, x¯) V +µ¯2(τ, x¯). (3.5)
From (3.3)–(3.5), we obtain
W(t, x) max
µ1(·)∈At1
[ t+∆∫
t
r
(
s,X(s),µ1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds + V +µ2
(
t +∆,X(t +∆))
]
= V +µ2(t, x).
Since µ2(·) is arbitrary, we get
W(t, x) V +(t, x).
We now prove the reverse inequality. Since (µ∗1(·),µ∗2(·)) is a saddle point at (t, x), we
have
V +(t, x) min
µ2(·)∈At2
[ T∫
t
r
(
s,X∗(s),µ∗1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds + g(X∗(T ))
]
, (3.6)
where X∗(·) is the solution of (1.1) under (µ∗1(·),µ2(·)) with X∗(t) = x . Let (τ, x¯) ∈
[0, T ] ×H and µ¯1 ∈Aτ2 . Define V¯ +µ¯1 by
V¯ +µ¯1(τ, x¯)= minµ2(·)∈Aτ2
[ T∫
τ
r
(
s, X¯(s), µ¯1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds + g(X¯(T ))
]
,
where X¯(·) is the solution of (1.1) under (µ¯1(·),µ2(·)) with X¯(τ )= x¯ . We have,
V¯ + (τ, x¯) V +(τ, x¯).µ¯1
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V¯ +µ¯1(τ, x¯)= minµ2(·)∈Aτ2
[ τ+∆∫
τ
r
(
s, X¯(s), µ¯1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds + V¯ +µ¯1
(
τ +∆,X¯(τ +∆))
]
 min
µ2(·)∈Aτ2
[ τ+∆∫
τ
r
(
s, X¯(s), µ¯1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds + V +(τ +∆,X¯(τ +∆))
]
 min
µ2(·)∈Aτ2
max
µ1(·)∈Aτ1
[ τ+∆∫
τ
r
(
s,X(s),µ1(s),µ2(s)
)
ds
+ V+(τ +∆,x(τ +∆))
]
=W(τ,x),
where X(·) is the solution of (1.1) under (µ1(·),µ2(·)) with X(τ) = x¯ . Plugging these
into (3.6) with µ¯1(·)= µ∗1(·), we obtain
V +(t, x) V¯+
µ∗1
(t, x)W(t, x).
Hence (3.1) holds. Similarly (3.2) can be proved. ✷
Assuming that DPP holds, it is easy to see that the lower and upper value functions are
the viscosity solutions of the HJI equations given by
vt (t, x)−
〈
A(t)x, vx(t, x)
〉
H,H ∗ + sup
µ1∈M1
inf
µ2∈M2
G
(
t, x,Dv(t, x),µ1,µ2
)= 0,
(3.7)
vt (t, x)−
〈
A(t)x,Dv(t, x)
〉
H,H∗ + infµ2∈M2 supµ1∈M1
G
(
t, x,Dv(t, x),µ1,µ2
)= 0.
(3.8)
Note that in infinite-dimensional spaces there are several definitions of viscosity solutions.
Here we use the definition of viscosity solutions in the sense of [3,8]. We refer to [8] for
more details about this. Note that Eqs. (3.7) and (3.8) are the same in view of Fan’s mini-
max theorem [5]. Thus if we have the uniqueness of viscosity solutions of these equations,
the lower and upper value functions are the same and thus the game has value. We now
show the equivalence between the existence of saddle point equilibrium and DPP assum-
ing the uniqueness of viscosity solutions of (3.7) and (3.8). Note that in order to have the
uniqueness, we need more conditions and we refer to [3] for these details.
Theorem 3.3. Assume (A1) and (A2) and that Eqs. (3.7) and (3.8) have unique viscosity
solutions. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) There exists a saddle point equilibrium in relaxed strategies;
(ii) DPP holds, i.e., (3.1) and (3.2) are true.
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t = 0. The proof is analogous for any t . We have by continuity,
inf
µ2(·)∈A02
sup
µ1(·)∈A01
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)= min
µ2(·)∈A02
max
µ1(·)∈A01
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
and
sup
µ1(·)∈A01
inf
µ2(·)∈A02
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)= max
µ1(·)∈A01
min
µ2(·)∈A02
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
.
By the uniqueness assumption and Fan’s minimax theorem, V+(t, x) = V −(t, x) =
V (t, x). Hence
min
µ2(·)∈A02
max
µ1(·)∈A01
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)= max
µ1(·)∈A01
min
µ2(·)∈A02
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
.
Choose (µ1(·),µ2(·)) ∈A01 ×A02 such that
min
µ2(·)∈A02
max
µ1(·)∈A01
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)= max
µ1(·)∈A01
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
and
max
µ1(·)∈A01
min
µ2(·)∈A02
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)= min
µ2(·)∈A02
R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
.
Clearly (µ1(·),µ2(·)) is a pair of saddle point strategies for (0, x). ✷
In the next theorem, we prove the existence of a saddle point equilibrium in a special
case. We make the following assumption:
(A4) Let b¯, r¯ be independent of x and let g be a bounded linear functional on H .
Theorem 3.4. Assume (A1), (A2), and (A4). Then there exists a saddle point equilibrium
in (open loop) relaxed strategies.
Proof. For a fixed x ∈H,µ1(·) ∈A01, the map
µ2(·) → R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
is continuous in weak∗ topology. Similarly the map
µ1(·) → R
(
0, x,µ1(·),µ2(·)
)
is continuous in weak∗ topology. Now under (A4), it is easy to see that the sets{
µ2(·) ∈A02: R
(
0, x, µ¯1(·),µ2(·)) l
}
,{
µ1(·) ∈A01: R
(
0, x,µ1(·), µ¯2(·)) l
}
are convex for all l ∈ R, µ¯1(·) ∈A01, µ¯02 ∈A02. Hence by Fan’s minimax theorem [5], the
desiring result follows. ✷
We now prove sufficient condition under some smoothness assumptions.
M.K. Ghosh et al. / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 283 (2003) 167–179 177Theorem 3.5. Assume (A1)–(A3) and let A be generator of analytic semigroup. Let DPP
hold. Suppose the equation
vt (t, x)−
〈
A(t)x, vx(t, x)
〉
H,H ∗ + infµ2∈M2 supµ1∈M1
G
(
t, x, vx(t, x),µ1,µ2
)
= vt (t, x)−
〈
A(t)x, vx(t, x)
〉
H,H ∗ + sup
µ1∈M1
inf
µ2∈M2
G
(
t, x, vx(t, x),µ1,µ2
)= 0
(3.9)
has a bounded smooth solution satisfying
v(T , x)= g(x). (3.10)
(i) Suppose µ∗1(·) ∈A01 is such that for any µ2(·) ∈A02, if X∗(·) denotes the correspond-
ing state process with X∗(0)= x and if
max
µ1∈M1
min
µ2∈M2
G
(
t,X∗(t),Wx
(
t,X∗(t)
)
,µ1,µ2
)
= min
µ2∈M2
G
(
t,X∗(t),Wx
(
t,X∗(t)
)
,µ∗1(t),µ2
) (3.11)
for a.e. t , then µ∗1(·) is optimal for player 1 for (0, x).
(ii) Suppose µ∗2(·) ∈A02 is such that for any µ1(·) ∈A01, if X∗(·) denotes the correspond-
ing state process with X∗(0)= x and if
min
µ2∈M2
max
µ1∈M1
G
(
t,X∗(t),Wx
(
t,X∗(t)
)
,µ1,µ2
)
= max
µ1∈M1
G
(
t,X∗(t),Wx
(
t,X∗(t)
)
,µ1,µ
∗
2(t)
) (3.12)
for a.e. t , then µ∗2(·) is optimal for player 2 for (0, x).
Proof. We prove only part (i). Part (ii) can be proved in an analogous way. First note that
by Proposition 6.3 in [8], a classical solution of (3.8) is a viscosity solution of (3.8). From
the uniqueness of viscosity solution, we have W = V . Now X∗(t) is Lipschitz on [ε,T ]
for any ε > 0 [9]. Thus for any ε > 0, we have for t a.e. in [ε,T ],
d
dt
V
(
t,X∗(t)
)= Vt(t,X∗(t))− 〈A(t)X∗(t),Vx(t,X∗(t))〉H,H ∗
+ b(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ2(t))Vx(t,X∗(t))
= Vt
(
t,X∗(t)
)+G(t,X∗(t),Vx(t,X∗(t)),µ∗1(t),µ2(t))
− r(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ2(t))
 Vt
(
t,X∗(t)
)+ min
µ2∈M2
G
(
t, x∗(t),Vx
(
t,X∗(t)
)
,µ∗1(t),µ2
)
− r(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ2(t))
= Vt
(
t,X∗(t)
)+ max
µ1∈M1
min
µ2∈M2
G
(
t,X∗(t),Vx
(
t,X∗(t)
)
,µ1,µ2
)
− r(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ2(t))
=−r(t,X∗(t),µ∗1(t),µ2(t)). (3.13)
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R
(
ε,X(ε),µ∗1(·),µ2(·)
)
 V
(
ε,X(ε)
)
.
Now letting ε→ 0, we get
R
(
0, x,µ∗1(·),µ2(·)
)
 V (0, x).
Thus µ∗1(·) is optimal for player 1 for (0, x). ✷
4. Conclusions
We have studied a differential game of fixed duration where the state equation is gov-
erned by a semilinear controlled evolution equation in a separable Hilbert space. We have
established necessary conditions for optimality by proving a minimax theorem. We have
established the equivalence between dynamic programming principle and existence of a
saddle point equilibrium. Finally we have derived some sufficient conditions for optimality.
Throughout our paper, we have assumed that the operator A occurring in the state equa-
tion is time independent. We would like to point out that the minimax principle proved in
Section 2 can be extended in a routine manner even if the operator A has time dependence.
Viscosity solutions, however, run into difficulties if A is dependent on time. Thus a result of
Section 3, viz., the dynamic programming principle implies the existence of saddle point
equilibrium, established via viscosity solutions, cannot easily be extended to the case of
time dependent A. This needs further investigation.
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